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Abstract 
Purpose This study aims to empirically investigate the effects of competence and 
goodwill trust on knowledge creation and the moderating effects of legal inadequacy 
on those relationships.    
Design/methodology/approach A questionnaire survey was used to collect data from 
196 research and development alliances in China. Hierarchical moderated regression 
was used to test the research hypotheses.   
Findings We find that competence trust has a positive and linear relationship with 
knowledge creation while goodwill trust has an inverted U-shaped relationship with it. 
The results also reveal that the inverted U-shaped relationship between goodwill trust 
and knowledge creation is stronger when legal inadequacy is high, while the impact of 
competence trust on knowledge creation is not influenced by legal inadequacy. 
Originality/value The findings provide insights into the distinctive effects of 
competence and goodwill trust on knowledge creation in partnerships, deepening 
current understandings of the bright and dark sides of inter-firm trust. This study also 
clarifies the influences of legal inadequacy on the effectiveness of competence and 
goodwill trust, which enhances existing knowledge about the impact of legal systems 
on the relationships between inter-firm trust and knoweldge management.  
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1. Introduction 
A growing body of studies finds that external knowledge sources, such as 
research and development (R&D) alliances, play critical roles for firms to create new 
knowledge and gain competitive advantages (Wang et al., 2011; Shu et al., 2012; 
Ramirez et al., 2012; Sheng et al., 2013; Lloria and Peris-Ortiz, 2014; Zhang et al., 
2016). Inter-firm partnerships may suffer from various opportunistic risks, therefore 
trust is considered as an important informal governance mechanism to ensure the 
success of knowledge absorption and creation for firms in R&D alliances (Yeung et 
al., 2009; Shu  at al., 2012; Kuo, 2013). To develop technological innovations, firms 
must create new knowledge together with R&D alliance partners (Un and Asakawa, 
2015). Inter-firm trust can decrease transaction costs in R&D alliances (Faems et al., 
2008) and hence partners are more willing to collaborate, which helps a firm to 
develop not only new knowledge but also new applications of existing knowledge (Li 
et al., 2010; Cai et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2014).    
Researchers argue that trust is a multidimensional concept (Mayer et al., 1995; 
Kuo, 2013). A firm may trust a partner in certain aspects and distrust the same partner 
in other areas (Jeffries and Reed, 2000). Competence trust refers to the positive 
expectations about a partner’s ability to perform according to an agreement, whereas 
goodwill trust is the partner’s intentions to fulfill its role in the relationship (Lui and 
Ngo, 2004; Faems et al., 2008). The two types of trust reflect different expectations 
and play different roles in partnerships (Levin and Cross, 2004; Lui and Ngo, 2004). 
For example, a certain level of goodwill trust implies a reduced threat of opportunism, 
such as knowledge appropriation risks, but competence trust does not (Lui and Ngo, 
2004). Therefore, distinguishing between goodwill and competence trust can lead to a 
holistic understanding on how to manage knowledge creation in R&D alliances using 
informal governance mechanisms (Connelly et al., 2015).   
      A knowledge-based view of firm is used to examine the effects of inter-firm trust 
on knowledge creation (Nonaka, 1994). Knowledge is the most strategically 
significant resource of a firm, and a firm can be considered as mechanisms that 
facilitate knowledge creation (Grant, 1996).  Knowledge creation is a dynamic and 
interactive process that leads to a growth in knowledge stock (Smith et al., 2005; 
Samaddar and Kadiyala, 2006). This process involves conversion and integration of 
various sources of knowledge, which is facilitated by trust (Nonaka, 1994; Zahra and 
George, 2002).  
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       Although extant research has noted that transition economies represent an 
institutional environment characterized by a lack of well-established legal frameworks, 
with few exceptions (e.g., Sheng et al., 2013; Zhou and Poppo, 2010), researchers 
generally overlook the impact of legal systems on the roles of trust. Meanwhile, 
empirical evidence indicates that legal systems influence inter-organizational learning 
and knowledge creation (Zhou and Poppo, 2010; Cai et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2017). 
In particular, inadequate legal systems cannot impose severe punishments on unlawful 
or unethical competitive behaviors such as contract violations, copyright piracy, and 
counterfeiting, and make it difficult for firms to protect intellectual property rights 
and other business interests (Zhou and Poppo, 2010; Zhou et al., 2014). Unreliable 
and unstable legal systems may increase collaboration uncertainties and risks, which 
reduce firms’ anticipation of the value of knowledge creation (Hemmert, et al., 2016; 
Zhang et al., 2017). Legal inadequacy thus drives firms to rely on trust to resolve their 
disputes and gain institutional supports, and hence influences the effectiveness of trust 
(Cai et al., 2010; Sheng et al., 2013; Kuo, 2013). Therefore, an institutional 
contingency perspective provides an important lens to examine how inter-firm trust 
affects knowledge creation in R&D alliances (Cai et al., 2010; Jiang et al., 2013; 
Hemmert, et al., 2016).  
        Drawing on the knowledge-based view and institutional theory, this study seeks 
to empirically investigate the distinctive effects of competence and goodwill trust on 
knowledge creation and the impacts of legal inadequacy. This study addresses two 
research questions. First, what are the effects of competence and goodwill trust on 
knowledge creation? Second, how does legal inadequacy moderate such effects?   
 
2. Theoretical background and research hypotheses  
2.1. Competence and goodwill trust   
Trust can be defined as the “willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions 
of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that 
other party” (Mayer et al., 1995:712). It reflects a firm’s expectation that alliance 
partners can be relied on to fulfil obligations and behave in a predictable manner, and 
the firm’s confidence in partners’ reliability and integrity (Schoorman et al., 2007; 
Kuo, 2013). Trust has been viewed as a relational lubricant and a substitute for formal 
governance mechanisms in alliances (Ireland and Webb, 2007; Faems et al., 2008). It 
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can promote collaboration, dispute resolution, and the sharing of risks and costs 
associated with exploring new opportunities (Molina-Morales et al., 2011).  
As a state of mind about an aspect of a relationship, a firm has different reasons 
to trust an alliance partner (Mayer et al., 1995; Levin and Cross, 2004). Competence 
and goodwill have been identified as two dimensions that explain a major portion of 
trustworthiness (Das and Teng, 2001; Faems et al., 2008). Competence trust stems 
from the positive expectation that a given partner has the managerial and technical 
capabilities and skills that enable the partner to perform specific tasks and to have 
influences within some specific domains (Das and Teng, 2001). It emphasizes the 
knowledge aspects and rational evaluations of a partner’s ability to carry out 
obligations (Jiang et al., 2013).  A partner is perceived as competent and capable if it 
can provide adequate rational grounds or evidence (Connelly et al., 2015). In contrast, 
goodwill trust is rooted in perceptions about a partner’s motives, honesty, and 
integrity, and is characterized by benevolence, open commitment, and vulnerability 
(Yeung et al., 2009). Goodwill trust arises from repeated interactions and the 
alignment of values and motives between partners (Lui and Ngo, 2004). It exists when 
a firm believes partners are willing to act in ways exceeding stipulated contractual 
agreements (Ireland and Webb, 2007). Different values and motives between partners 
can undermine confidence and erode goodwill trust (Jeffries and Reed, 2000). 
Competence and goodwill trust are different and may coexist in partnerships (Das and 
Teng, 2001; Levin and Cross, 2004). They are created and sustained through different 
processes. For example, competence trust can be developed based on public 
information collected from markets, while goodwill trust usually arises from ongoing 
interactions (Lui and Ngo, 2004).   
Although a firm rarely depends on only one type of trust to manage partnerships, 
with few exceptions (Levin and Cross, 2004; Jiang et al., 2013), previous studies have 
typically employed unidimensional or global measures to empirically investigate the 
effects of inter-firm trust (e.g., Yeung et al., 2009; Cai et al., 2010; Molina-Morales et 
al., 2011; Hemmert et al., 2016). This approach ignores the complex nature of inter-
firm trust, leading to mixed empirical findings. For examples, researchers have found 
both linear (Wang et al., 2011; Shu et al., 2012) and quadratic (Villena et al., 2011; 
Zhou et al., 2014) relationships between trust and inter-organizational learning and 
innovation. Researchers also argue that inter-firm trust may lead to relational lock-in 
and over-embeddedness in alliances, which restrict the flow of novel information and 
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ideas and impede knowledge creation (Molina-Morales et al., 2011; Villena et al., 
2011; Zhou et al. 2014). Hence, the distinctive effects of competence and goodwill 
trust in an alliance on knowledge creation call for further investigation.  
2.2. Knowledge creation 
       Knowledge creation can be defined as the extent to which a firm successfully 
develops new technology, product, and market knowledge by collaborating with 
partners (Samaddar and Kadiyala, 2006). It lies at the heart of a firm’s core 
capabilities and is critical to the long-term success of the firm (Ramirez et al., 2012; 
Lloria and Peris-Ortiz, 2014). With the increasing pace of market changes, it becomes 
difficult for firms to create new knowledge using internal resources alone (Wang et 
al., 2011). Hence, they turn to partnerships to develop new knowledge (Smith et al., 
2005; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). R&D alliances can expose firms to different 
knowledge and perspectives and open new sources of ideas or expertise, which 
promote them to consider different alternatives and increase their creativity and 
willingness to explore new ideas and develop new knowledge (Robson et al., 2008). 
Partners are more likely to get more chances to observe each other’s behaviors and to 
work together to solve problems, which facilitate knowledge combination (Zahra and 
George, 2002; Lui and Ngo, 2004). External knowledge constitutes an important input 
for a firm’s knowledge conversions (Ramirez et al., 2012). By integrating and 
combining the acquired external knowledge regarding technologies, products, and 
markets into its own knowledge base, new knowledge is created (Zahra and George, 
2002; Zhou et al. 2014).  
2.3. Legal inadequacy 
      Legal inadequacy refers to the extent to which legal systems cannot provide firms 
with sufficient protection for their intellectual property rights and other business 
interests (Sheng et al., 2013). In emerging markets such as China, firms may suffer 
from relatively underdeveloped legal systems such as insufficient laws, ineffective 
legislation, and regulatory loopholes (Zhang et al., 2017). In addition, the China’s 
legal systems lack transparency and consistency because the regulations and laws 
formulated by local governments may change frequently (Zhou and Poppo, 2010). 
Moreover, the law enforceability of the China’s legal systems is also low because of 
the lack of judicial independence (Zhou and Poppo, 2010; Zhang et al., 2016). Hence, 
court decisions may not be effectively implemented and a firm may not be able to get 
their compensations for a variety of reasons. Therefore, firms often face high costs 
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when they resolve conflict or problems through judiciary means in China (Cai et al., 
2010; Zhang et al., 2017).  
       It should be noted that the development level of the legal systems in different 
provinces and cities of China is far from balanced. In the developed areas of China, 
the transparency of law enforcement is better, and firms’ consciousness of protecting 
themselves through legal means is also stronger (Ang and Jia, 2014). In contrast, 
inadequate legal protection and weak law enforceability are prevalent problems in the 
under-developed regions of China, and the available legal services are also extremely 
scarce. Meanwhile, the judiciary and court systems are more corrupted in the under-
developed areas (Ang and Jia, 2014). Therefore, Chinese firms face various levels of 
legal inadequacy (Sheng et al., 2013; Zhou and Poppo, 2010). 
2.4. Research hypotheses  
2.4.1. The impact of competence trust on knowledge creation  
       Competence trust indicates that a firm believes its partner is capable of fulfilling 
its roles and responsibilities, and can find the best solutions for both current and new 
problems as they emerge (Das and Teng, 2001; Faems et al., 2008). Competence trust 
can promote knowledge creation in two ways. First, with low perceived performance 
risks, alliance members have positive expectations of collaborative R&D projects and 
a great inspiration to invest in physical and human resources for collaborative 
knowledge development, even when confronting with predicaments (Levin and Cross, 
2004). Hence, competence trust brings insurance over the quality, relevance, and 
timeliness of knowledge flows within a R&D alliance, enabling a firm to create novel 
knowledge unrelated to its own knowledge domains (Molina-Morales et al., 2011).   
Second, when a firm feels confident about the managerial and technical 
capabilities of a partner, the firm will reduce the costs and time of verifying the 
validity and usefulness of the knowledge that is outside its expertise (Jiang et al., 2013; 
Kuo, 2013). Competence trust thus decreases the need for repeated explanation and 
facilitates less frequent but productive interactions (Das and Teng, 2001). A firm is 
more likely to listen to and learn from partners’ suggestions, and take actions 
accordingly. The speed, depth, and width of knowledge development are also 
improved, which enable a firm to fully seize the benefits of integrating partners’ 
knowledge and allow the firm to apply the partners’ competence and resources for 
knowledge creation (Smith et al., 2005;Un and Asakawa, 2015). Therefore, we 
propose the following hypothesis.  
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H1. There is a positive and linear relationship between competence trust and 
knowledge creation. 
2.4.2. The impact of goodwill trust on knowledge creation  
         Goodwill trust enables R&D alliance partners to create knowledge together 
(Zahra and George, 2002). Goodwill trust not only leads to a working environment 
with open communication, team spirit, and cooperation, but also generates incentives, 
reciprocity, and solidarity that are conductive for collaborative knowledge 
development within a R&D alliance (Doney et al., 1998; Jiang et al., 2013). It ensures 
alliance partners that their knowledge and resources will be used for good purposes 
and the relationship-specific assets developed during the partnership will be protected 
(Poppo et al., 2008). Furthermore, a certain level of goodwill trust can establish a 
basis for intimacy, predictability, and reliability among partners, and hence firms 
become more open and receptive of new knowledge and more willing to explore new 
opportunities together (Molina-Morales et al., 2011; Villena et al., 2011). Knowledge 
creation can greatly benefit from such diverse and novel inputs (Grant, 1996; 
Samaddar and Kadiyala, 2006).  
However, the impact of goodwill trust is unlikely to remain linear and the 
positive effects may decline after it reaches a certain level (Villena et al., 2011; Zhou 
et al., 2014). To develop and maintain goodwill trust, a firm must constantly invest 
resources in an alliance partnership (Molina-Morales et al., 2011). Therefore, the costs 
of maintaining and sustaining goodwill trust with partners may surpass the benefits it 
brings to the firm (Villena et al., 2011). Excessive levels of goodwill trust may reduce 
a firm’s efforts in monitoring, which can create occasions for opportunistic behaviors 
(Molina-Morales et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2014). Too much goodwill trust may also 
restrain a firm’s motivation to critically evaluate acquired knowledge, leading to the 
problem of insufficient communication (Ireland and Webb, 2007). Alliance partners 
may take for granted in knowing each other’s ideas and plans, and fail to discover 
changes in business environments (Mayer et al., 1995). In addition, goodwill trust 
indicates greater emotional bonds with alliance partners and the firm may be trapped 
in unhealthy relationships (Poppo et al., 2008; Robson et al., 2008). The firm may be 
impeded from acquiring new information and knowledge from other sources and 
blind obedience may arise (Molina-Morales et al, 2011; Zhou et al., 2014). 
Consequently, we argue that there is an inflection point in the relationship between 
goodwill trust and knowledge creation, after which goodwill trust negatively 
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influences knowledge creation. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis. 
H2. There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between goodwill trust and knowledge 
creation. 
2.4.3. The moderating effects of legal inadequacy 
       High levels of legal inadequacy indicate that there is a lack of rule of law and it is 
difficult or expensive to follow legal processes to protect business interests and 
enforce contracts, which increase exchange hazard (Zhou and Poppo, 2010; Hemmert, 
et al., 2016). Chinese culture is characterized by high power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance, and hence managers rely on authorities or experts to determine the quality 
and value of knowledge and tackle ambiguities and risks (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
Competence trust can be formed based on public information about partners’ 
reputation and resources, such as R&D investments, patents, copyrights, and number 
of engineers and scientists (Mayer et al., 1995; Das and Teng, 2001). It helps firms to 
identify expertise and build relationships with experts, which reduce uncertainties and 
threats caused by inadequate legal systems (Doney et al., 1998; Jiang et al. 2013). 
When there is a lack of laws and regulations to govern collaboration, firms depend 
more on competence trust to evaluate and assess partners’ capabilities to meet 
obligations and to guarantee the value of the knowledge created together with the 
partners (Doney et al., 1998). Hence, competence trust plays a more significant role in 
learning from partners and creating new knowledge when legal systems are weak and 
inefficient. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis. 
H3. The positive effect of competence trust on knowledge creation is stronger when 
legal inadequacy is high.   
         Legal inadequacy also strengthens the positive effect of goodwill trust on 
knowledge creation when goodwill trust is at relatively low or moderate levels. 
Chinese culture emphasizes collectivism and hence managers tend to maintain 
harmony and use personal ties or guanxi to coordinate transactions (Hofstede et al., 
2010). High levels of legal inadequacy may increase dysfunctional competition 
(Zhang et al., 2017). For example, a partner may not contribute to knowledge creation, 
claim an unfair share of the created value, or leak the knowledge to parties outside an 
alliance (Ireland and Webb, 2007). Certain levels of goodwill trust can deal with the 
threats of weak legal systems by ensuring that a partner’s behaviors are predictable 
and his/her intention is benevolent (Doney et al., 1998). Alliance partners are also 
more likely to become in-groups and make relationship-specific investments 
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(Hofstede et al., 2010). Hence, when legal inadequacy is high, certain levels of 
goodwill trust play a more important role in reducing uncertainties and risks in 
collaboration and hence are more important for knowledge creation (Zhou and Poppo, 
2010; Wang et al., 2011).  
        Legal inadequacy may also amplify the negative impact of goodwill trust on 
knowledge creation by aggravating collective blindness and partners’ opportunistic 
behaviors when goodwill trust is at high levels (Villena et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2014). 
In a collectivist and long-term oriented culture, managers may subordinate a firm’s 
performance for the alliance’s future potential benefits and believe the relationship is 
more important than profits, and their opinions are significantly influenced by 
partners (Hofstede et al., 2010; Lui and Ngo, 2012). High levels of legal inadequacy 
make it costly for firms to adjust alliances through contracts and hence they are more 
likely to suffer from undesired rigidity, inertia, and relational lock-in (Cai et al., 2010). 
Therefore, too much goodwill trust will lead to overdependence of alliance partners 
and firms may become too homogeneous in their routines and mental models, which 
constrain knowledge creation (Ireland and Webb, 2007). In addition, the possibility 
that a partner behaves opportunistically is determined by the calculation of the 
benefits of cheating and the costs of being caught (Doney et al., 1998; Yeung et al., 
2009). Managers may be reluctant to monitor collaboration and audit partners’ 
performance frequently and critically when there are high levels of goodwill trust, 
which reduce the possibility of detecting opportunism in alliances (Molina-Morales et 
al., 2011; Faems et al., 2008). High levels of legal inadequacy indicate that there is a 
lack of law to protect business interests and investments and it is costly to enforce 
contracts, which decrease the costs of opportunistic behaviors (Zhou and Poppo, 
2010). Hence, a partner may gain rewards for cheating and legal inadequacy amplifies 
the dark sides of goodwill trust. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis. 
H4. The inverted U-shaped effect of goodwill trust on knowledge creation is stronger 
(steeper) when legal inadequacy is high. 
 
3.  Research method  
3.1. Sampling and data collection 
       To test the aforementioned hypotheses, this study used cross-sectional survey 
data from 196 R&D alliances in China. R&D alliance is defined as the formal 
contractual relationships among two firms on collaborative new product and/or 
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technology development (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010; Jiang et al., 2013). Researchers 
argue that a firm’s partners are different in their characteristics and trustworthiness 
and thus the firm develops different levels of trust with partners across different R&D 
alliances (Schoorman et al., 2007).  Hence, R&D alliance was used as the unit of 
analysis of this study. 
       The study used a sample of 800 firms selected randomly from government 
directories of firms in the Hunan, Hubei, Shaanxi, Liaoning, Shanghai, and 
Guangdong provinces of China. They are located in Central, Northern, Eastern, and 
Southern China, respectively. Shanghai and Guangdong are two special economic 
zones in Eastern and Southern China and are among the most developed areas (Zhang 
et al., 2016). The Hunan, Hubei, Shaanxi, and Liaoning are industrial bases in Central 
and Northern China, reflecting the average stage of economic development (Wang et 
al., 2011). Each firm was contacted by telephone to (1) verify that it was currently 
engaged in at least one R&D alliance, (2) identify and locate key informants and 
obtain each informant’s contact information, and (3) verify the key informants who 
were knowledgeable about the firm’s management procedures regarding R&D 
alliances, and obtain his/her cooperation regarding participation in our study. Based 
on these responses, we identified 247 firms that had R&D alliances and were willing 
to participate in this research. 
      The English version of the questionnaire was first developed and subsequently 
translated into Chinese by a professor. The Chinese version was then translated back 
into English by another professor. Any conflicts were discussed by the researchers 
until they reached agreement. The research team, which included three professors and 
three research assistants, conducted five in-depth interviews with senior managers, 
during which they were asked to verify the relevance and completeness of the 
questionnaire. From their responses, measurement items were revised to clarify their 
meanings. A pilot test was then conducted with 28 managers using the Chinese 
questionnaire.  
A face-to-face interview method was used to collect survey data. The research 
team presented the questionnaires to informants of each firm and collected the surveys 
after their completion. The research team interviewed one senior manager (i.e., chief 
executive officer, vice president, or general manager), and one or more middle 
managers (i.e., R&D department manager or R&D project manager) in each firm, 
according to the number of R&D alliances identified. Specifically, senior managers 
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provided information about legal inadequacy, and middle managers were asked about 
inter-firm trust, knowledge creation, and collaboration with partners (i.e., behavioral 
uncertainty, prior ties, long-term orientation, and cooperation duration) in R&D 
alliances. Firm age was collected from government directories. 
 The research team successfully obtained responses from 189 firms and hence the 
effective response rate is 76.5%. We dropped 34 cases because of excessive missing 
data. To assess the informants’ quality, we asked these respondents to indicate the 
time (years) they worked for their firms. The means are 6.19 and 5.87 for the senior 
and middle managers respectively, indicating they were qualified respondents. Of the 
155 firms, 131 firms were involved in 1 alliance, 12 firms were involved in 2 
alliances, 7 firms were involved in 3 alliances, and 5 firms were involved in 4 
alliances. Therefore, the final sample consisted of 196 R&D alliances. Detailed 
information on the sample demographics is shown in Table 1. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here. 
------------------------------------------ 
We compared 155 participating and 58 nonparticipating firms on firm age, 
ownership, and industry using T-tests. All t-statistics are insignificant. Furthermore, 
we split the final sample into two groups according to the return date. The early-wave 
group consisted of 110 responses, while the late-wave group, which was received five 
months later, included 86 responses. T-tests performed on the two groups yield no 
statistically significant differences on any demographic characteristics. All these 
analyses suggest that nonresponse bias is not a concern in our study. 
We conducted the following tests to rule out the possibility of common method 
bias. First, we conducted Harman’s one-factor test (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986), 
which loads all perceptual items into an exploratory factor analysis. The first factor 
accounts for only 21.65% of the total variance, indicating common method bias is 
unlikely to be a major concern in our data. Second, we used a method variance (MV) 
marker test, which uses a scale theoretically unrelated to the constructs in the model 
as the MV marker variable, which is a proxy for common method variance (Lindell 
and Whitney, 2001). We used government support, which was measured by a five-
item scale, as the MV marker and selected the lowest positive correlation (r = 0.010) 
between the MV marker and other variables to adjust for construct correlations and 
statistical significance. Table 2 shows that none of the significant correlations became 
insignificant after the adjustment. Therefore, common method bias is not a serious 
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concern. 
3.2. Measurement design 
Based on the relevant literature, a survey instrument was designed with 
modification for the research context. A multiple-item, 5-point Likert-type scale (1= 
“strongly disagree”; 5= “strongly agree”) was used for all constructs. The scales are 
listed in the Appendix. 
        Competence trust was measured by four items capturing the positive 
expectations about partners’ capabilities and competence (Lui and Ngo, 2004; Jiang et 
al., 2013). We measured goodwill trust using three items about the confidence that a 
firm has in its partner’s integrity and good intentions (Schoorman et al., 2007). 
Following the study by Samaddar and Kadiyala (2006), we measured knowledge 
creation using three items reflecting the new technological, product, and market 
knowledge developed through R&D alliances. Legal inadequacy was measured by 
four items about the effectiveness and sufficiency of legal and judicial systems based 
on the studies by Cai et al. (2010) and Sheng et al. (2013). 
Firm age, cooperation duration, behavioral uncertainty, prior ties, and long-term 
orientation were included as control variables in the analysis as they may affect 
knowledge creation in R&D alliances. Firm age was measured by the number of years 
the firm has been in operation. We controlled firm age because established firms often 
have rich experiences in knowledge creation through R&D alliances (Schilke and 
Goerzen, 2010). Cooperation duration refers to the time length of the partnership 
between partners. Partners in long-lasting alliances may have more time to develop a 
mutual understanding, which is helpful for knowledge creation (Li et al., 2010). We 
measured cooperation duration by a single item, i.e., the number of years that both 
sides have been involved in the alliance partnership. 
Behavioral uncertainty occurs when a firm cannot effectively monitor or measure 
the performance or actions of its partners. As a kind of exchange risk, behavioral 
uncertainty may impede knowledge transfer among partners. Following Zhou and 
Poppo (2010), three items assessing the difficulty of evaluating the performance of a 
partner and the degree to which the partner follows contractual arrangements were 
used to measure behavioral uncertainty. Prior ties with a partner’s network provide 
the groundwork for alliances (Lui and Ngo, 2012). A good relationship with a 
partner’s network allows a firm to know the partner better and promotes joint 
knowledge creation among them. Prior ties were measured by four items capturing 
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previous collaborative relationships between a firm and the partner’s network 
(Robson et al., 2008). Long-term orientation refers to the expectation of working 
together in the future held by both of the exchange parties (Lui and Ngo, 2012). It has 
been found to be positively related to knowledge creation among partners (Poppo et 
al., 2008). Following Lui and Ngo (2012), five items about the expectation of 
developing long-term relationships with a partner were used to gauge long-term 
orientation. 
3.3. Reliability and validity  
        The reliability and validity assessments are reported in the Appendix. Reliability 
was assessed using the Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability (CR). Both 
Cronbach’s alpha (ranging from .73 to .91) and CR (ranging from .85 to .94) values 
are above .70, demonstrating adequate reliability. We assessed convergent validity 
using a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with structural equation modeling and the 
average variance extracted (AVE) of each construct (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). The 
CFA model fits the data satisfactorily (χ2 (278) = 415.80, goodness-of-fit index [GFI] 
= .86, confirmatory fit index [CFI] = .93, incremental fit index [IFI] = .93, and root 
mean squared error of approximation [RMSEA] = .06), and all factor loadings 
(ranging from .70 to .92) are highly significant (p < .001), indicating the convergent 
validity of the measures. All AVE values are above the recommended value of .50 
(ranging from .64 to .76), which also demonstrates adequate convergent validity 
(Fornell and Larcker, 1981).  
We assessed discriminant validity using chi-square difference test and AVE 
method. We performed chi-square difference tests for all constructs in pairs to 
determine whether the constrained model (i.e., the correlation of the paired constructs 
was fixed at 1) is significantly worse than the freely estimated model (i.e., all 
correlations were estimated freely). All chi-square differences are highly significant 
(e.g., goodwill trust vs. knowledge creation: △χ2 (1) =136.60, p < .001), in support of 
discriminant validity. Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and 
correlations of all constructs used in the study. An examination of Table 2 reveals that 
the square root of AVE for each construct is higher than the correlations between the 
focal construct and every other construct, which again supports discriminant validity 
(Fornell and Larcker, 1981).  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here. 
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4. Analyses and results 
         To mitigate the potential threat of multicollinearity, the independent and 
moderating variables are mean-centered prior to the formation of quadratic and 
interaction terms, as recommended by Aiken and West (1991). Furthermore, we 
calculate variance inflation factors (VIFs) to assess multicollinearity. The largest VIF 
value is 1.93, well below the benchmark of 10, suggesting multicollinearity is not a 
concern in this study (Aiken and West, 1991). 
       Hierarchical moderated regression is used to test the hypotheses. We enter the 
variables into the models in a three-step process: (1) control variables; (2) direct effect 
variables; and (3) moderating variables. The results presented in Table 3 reveal that 
the R2 value increases significantly for Model 2 and 3 and that they explain 42% and 
48% of the total variance in knowledge creation respectively. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 here. 
------------------------------------------ 
       As shown in Model 2, competence trust significantly affects knowledge creation 
(β= .29, p＜.001), and the effect of the quadratic term of competence trust is not 
significant. Hence, competence trust has a positive and linear effect on knowledge 
creation, in support of H1. Results also show that the quadratic term of goodwill trust 
negatively affects knowledge creation (β= -.16, p＜.05). Therefore, goodwill trust 
displays a curvilinear relationship with knowledge creation, which supports H2. 
Model 3 shows legal inadequacy does not significantly influence competence trust’s 
effect on knowledge creation. Hence, H3 is not supported. The interaction between 
goodwill trust squared and legal inadequacy is significantly negative (β= -.21, p＜.05), 
in support of H4.  
      To demonstrate visually the moderating effect of legal inadequacy, we plot the 
relationship between goodwill trust and knowledge creation for the low and high 
levels of legal inadequacy. As Figure 1 shows, when goodwill trust is relatively low 
(left side of the dotted line), knowledge creation increases faster with increasing 
goodwill trust when legal inadequacy is high. When goodwill trust is relatively high 
(right side of the dotted line), knowledge creation decreases faster with increasing 
goodwill trust when legal inadequacy is high. Hence, legal inadequacy strengthens the 
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inverted U-shaped effect of goodwill trust on knowledge creation. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here. 
------------------------------------------ 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions  
While literature has emphasized the importance of trust on managing knowledge 
in partnerships, the mechanisms through which trust affects knowledge creation 
remain equivocal (Wang et al., 2011; Shu et al., 2012; Villena et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 
2014). To deepen the understandings of the roles of inter-firm trust, this study 
investigates the distinctive effects of goodwill and competence trust on knowledge 
creation. Using a sample of R&D alliances in China, we find that competence and 
goodwill trust play different roles in improving knowledge creation. In particular, 
competence trust has a positive and linear effect on knowledge creation, which is 
consistent with the argument that trust facilitates inter-firm knowledge management 
by promoting collaboration (Wang et al., 2011; Connelly et al., 2015). Hence, 
competence trust is a good thing that the more the merrier. In contrast, goodwill trust 
has an inverted U-shaped relationship with knowledge creation, which indicates that a 
moderate level of goodwill trust is optimal and very strong or weak goodwill trust is 
detrimental for knowledge creation. Hence, goodwill trust has both bright and dark 
sides and may be in danger of being either “oversold” or “undersold” (Villena et al., 
2011; Zhou et al., 2014). In other words, too much goodwill trust can be as bad as too 
little and may damage knowledge creation in R&D alliances. Therefore, competence 
trust has no negative effects on knowledge creation but high levels of goodwill trust in 
an alliance may be harmful for collaborative knowledge development. 
      The findings also reveal that the effect of goodwill trust is contingent on legal 
inadequacy. Both bright and dark sides of goodwill trust are amplified by legal 
inadequacy. In underdeveloped legal systems, a moderate level of goodwill trust is the 
best for knowledge creation in R&D alliances. Meanwhile, high levels of goodwill 
trust can lead to lower degrees of knowledge creation and a firm may suffer more 
from reduced pursuit of new knowledge when legal inadequacy is high. Competence 
trust indicates that a firm may hold expert power (Mayer et al., 1995) and has the 
ability to provide or withhold rewards in promoting desired behaviors in partnerships 
(Ireland and Webb, 2007). Chinese culture has high power distance (Hofstede et al., 
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2010) and hence power plays a significant role in managing uncertainties and 
relationships (Yeung et al., 2009). Power can provide legitimacy and stability to 
partnerships and influence partners’ decisions by creating positive or negative 
consequences. Hence, a firm may use power, instead of competence trust, to tackle 
the risks and threats associated with legal inadequacy when managing R&D alliances 
in China. Therefore, legal inadequacy does not moderate the effect of competence 
trust on knowledge creation. 
5.1. Theoretical contributions   
   This study contributes to literature in two ways. First, although scholars have 
cautioned that an overall measure of trust may not be able to provide a meaningful 
understanding of its roles in inter-firm relationships (Das and Teng, 2001), and that 
trust has both bright and dark sides (Molina-Morales et al., 2011; Villena et al., 2011), 
the positive and negative effects of competence and goodwill trust have seldom been 
explored empirically. This study is a step forward in understanding the distinctive 
effects of competence and goodwill trust on knowledge creation in R&D alliances. 
We find that the two types of trust affect knowledge creation through different 
mechanisms, contributing to literature by resolving the inconsistent findings regarding 
the roles of trust in inter-organizational knowledge management (Villena et al., 2011; 
Zhou et al., 2014). The curvilinear relationship between goodwill trust and knowledge 
creation indicates that the gains of investments in goodwill trust might be quite 
limited after it exceeds a threshold, enriching current knowledge about the 
effectiveness of inter-firm trust (Molina-Morales et al., 2011). This study thus 
provides a more nuanced understanding and a holistic picture on how to adjust 
investments in inter-firm relationships to fully reap the benefits of trust on knowledge 
creation. 
        Second, despite the widespread recognition of the importance of trust in 
promoting knowledge creation in partnerships, the influences of institutional 
parameters in shaping its roles remain underexplored. The study adopts a contingent 
view of alliance knowledge management by investigating the moderating effects of 
legal inadequacy. It represents an initial attempt to examine how the effects of inter-
firm trust are influenced by the legal environment (Cai et al., 2010; Hemmert et al., 
2016). We contribute to literature by providing empirical evidence that inter-firm trust 
is not universal in its ability to promote knowledge creation: the effectiveness of 
goodwill trust is contingent upon the legal context of a R&D alliance, whereas that of 
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competence trust is not. Therefore, competence trust is a good substitute for formal 
governance mechanisms whereas relying on goodwill trust to manage R&D alliances 
may impede knowledge creation under weak legal systems (Li et al., 2010; Sheng et 
al., 2013). Such findings provide a possible explanation for why Chinese firms can 
create knowledge and innovate without sufficient legal protection and deepen current 
understandings about the relationships between inter-firm trust and knowledge 
management (Kuo, 2013; Zhou et al., 2014).   
5.2. Managerial implications 
This study can provide guidelines for firms on how to improve knowledge 
creation and manage partnerships in China. We suggest managers rely on both 
competence and goodwill trust to manage R&D alliances for knowledge creation. In 
addition, they must distinguish between competence and goodwill trust and 
understand their distinctive roles in promoting knowledge creation. In particular, 
when building R&D alliances, managers can focus on the professionalism of partners, 
the usefulness of their advices, and their performance. Trusting partners with such 
characteristics enables firms to create new technological, product, and market 
knowledge. For the partners that have made sacrifices and are concerned with the 
firms’ welfare and success, developing a trust-based relationship is advisable. 
However, managers should be warned that trusting those partners blindly may lead to 
opportunism or unintended spillovers in R&D alliances, which hinder knowledge 
creation. Hence, managers should be cautious about the negative effect of goodwill 
trust, and regularly monitor the collaboration and evaluate R&D alliances’ 
performance to establish an optimal level of goodwill trust. Moreover, when firms 
face underdeveloped legal environments, managers can rely on competence trust to 
manage R&D alliances as its effectiveness is not affected by the quality of legal 
systems. In contrast, managers should understand that goodwill trust is a double-
edged sword. We suggest managers only use moderate levels of goodwill trust to 
manage R&D alliances when legal inadequacy is high because high levels of goodwill 
trust may hinder knowledge creation.    
5.3. Limitations and future research directions 
This study has limitations that open up avenues for future research. First, the 
results are based on R&D alliances in China. A useful extension will be to replicate 
this study in other countries with different institutional, cultural, and business 
environments to generalize the findings. Second, researchers argue that inter-firm 
18 
 
trust also influences knowledge acquisition and transfer in partnerships (Zahra and 
George, 2002; Kuo et al., 2013; Zhou et al., 2014). Exploring how goodwill and 
competence trust affects knowledge acquisition and the relationships between 
knowledge acquisition and creation are interesting research topics. Third, besides 
trust, power, which is also a multidimensional concept, may also influence knowledge 
creation in R&D alliances (Ireland and Webb, 2007). Future research may explore 
how different kinds of trust and power jointly affect knowledge management.    
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Appendix Constructs and items 
Construct Loadings 
Behavioral uncertainty (CA=.73; CR=.85; AVE=.65) 
It is difficult to measure this partner’s performance. 
Evaluating the performance of this partner requires extensive 
inspection. 
It is difficult to evaluate whether this partner follows contracts. 
.85 
.75 
 
.82 
 
Prior ties (CA=.86; CR=.90; AVE=.70) 
Before we ally with the partner, 
we have a lot of interactions with its clients. 
we have close relationships with its clients. 
we have partnerships with its clients.  
we have a good understanding with each other. 
 
.83 
.91 
.90 
.70 
 
Long-term orientation (CA=.91; CR=.94; AVE=.74) 
We expect this partner to be working with us for a long time.  
We will automatically renew the contract with this partner. 
We focus on long-term goals in this partnership.  
Maintaining a long-term relationship with this partner is important 
to us.  
We believe that over the long run the relationship with this partner 
will be profitable. 
.76 
.90 
.87 
.88 
 
.89 
 
Legal inadequacy (CA=.81; CR=.88; AVE=.64) 
 
It is difficult for the legal system to protect the interests for all 
partners. 
“Rule of man” is more common than “rule of law” in business field. 
The legal system (e.g., intellectual property laws) is very weak. 
The decisions made by the judicial system are difficult to be 
smoothly executed.  
.83 
 
.81 
.84 
.71 
 
Goodwill trust (CA=.80; CR=.88; AVE=.72) 
This partner is very concerned about our welfare. 
This partner is very concerned about our success. 
The partner will help us when we are in trouble. 
.80 
.88 
.87 
Competence trust (CA=.83; CR=.89; AVE=.67) 
This partner has no problems in answering our questions. 
This partner is very professional about the work it does. 
The advice provided by this partner is always helpful. 
This partner has the ability to meet our needs. 
.81 
.84 
.82 
.80 
Knowledge creation (CA=.84; CR=.90; AVE=.76) 
By allying with the R&D partner,   
we develop new technological knowledge successfully. 
we develop new product knowledge successfully. 
.79 
.92 
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we develop new market knowledge successfully. .89 
Notes: CA= Cronbach’s alpha; CR=composite reliability; AVE= average variance extracted. 
 
